Thursday 24 May 2012

€360 Billion - Greece Total Debt - Infographics

http://demonocracy.info/infographics/eu/debt_greek/debt_greek.html

€360 Billion - Greece Total Debt
€360,000,000,000 - This is Greece's entire government debt.

Greece Loans Lineup



Who Loaned Greece the Money - Detail by Lender
A whole lot of banks and institutions loaned Greece the money, now Banks fear they won't be getting back.
The information comes from Bloomberg via ZeroHedge



€38.0B
FROM:
EUROPE
European Union



           
€45.0B
FROM:
EUROPE
Eurosystem SMP

Money borrowed by Greece - European Union & Eurosystem SMP

NOTES:
€2 Billion Euro
€2 Billion - A Truck Load Full of Cash


http://demonocracy.info/infographics/eu/debt_greek/debt_greek.html

All information on this website is for educational purposes only and is not intended to provide financial advise. Any statements about profits or income, expressed or implied, does not represent a guarantee. Your actual trading may result in losses as no trading system is guaranteed. You accept full responsibilities for your actions, trades, profit or loss, and agree to hold MinKL Invest harmless in any and all ways.

Regulators demand review of Facebook's IPO



 May 22, 2012 by 
As Facebook's share prices continue to fall, US regulators have called for a review of last week's Initial Public Offering (IPO) of the world's largest social networking site.

The financial services group Morgan Stanley has been ordered to account for its handling of the sale of Facebook's shares.

Of particular concern for regulators at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FIRA) is a report that the consumer internet analyst at the stock's lead underwriter, Morgan Stanley, cut revenue forecasts for Facebook in the days before the offering, information that may not have reached many investors before the stock was listed.

Traders questioning whether the initial share price was realistic to begin with have been further shaken by the company's decreasing value on the NASDAQ.

On Friday, the day of the IPO, the firm was valued at over $100bn but that has has been more than decimated, dropping by $16bn in under a week.

Al Jazeera's Dominic Kane reports.

License:

Standard YouTube License


All information on this website is for educational purposes only and is not intended to provide financial advise. Any statements about profits or income, expressed or implied, does not represent a guarantee. Your actual trading may result in losses as no trading system is guaranteed. You accept full responsibilities for your actions, trades, profit or loss, and agree to hold MinKL Invest harmless in any and all ways.

The Accounting For JP Morgan’s Bet - Francine McKenna (@retheauditors)


When Is A Hedge Not A Hedge? The Accounting For JP Morgan’s Bet


By Francine • May 18th, 2012 • Category: PricewaterhouseCoopersPure ContentRegulators, Laws, Standards, RegulationsWriting for Others

Overgrown Hedge
Yesterday’s column at American Banker digs into the accounting for JP Morgan’s reported “hedge”.  I was shocked – OK, not really – that no main stream media outlet had explained the stunning announcement made by Jamie Dimon last Thursday of a $2 billion loss on a series of trades made by the Chief Investment Office in accounting terms. CIO is the group purportedly managing the investment of the bank’s excess deposits.  In London. As in, the low risk sweep function. Uh-huh.
There’s lots of speculation about the nature of the trade itself. The best I’ve seen is the ongoing coverage at FT Alphaville by Lisa Pollack, in particular.
The gist of all the stories is that the CIO was selling protection on the CDX.NA.IG.9 (going long) to balance out the tranches on the high yield index that they’d bought (going short, which turned out to be profitable when Dynegy and AMR Corp defaulted).
In this way the trade would be both a curve play and across indices — one high yield, one investment grade, with the high yield play levered further because it was a tranche. The long on the IG.9 also would have helped to fund the rather expensive short on the high yield tranches.
If you are an expert in this stuff, please get in touch. I’d buy a big steak for someone who can walk me through it, maybe at a quiet table at Gene & Georgetti’s.
I took a long look at the 10K and 10Q and the first clue was the pretty stark statement, all over the place that the credit derivative number, “Represents the net notional amount of protection purchased and sold of single-name and portfolio credit derivatives used to manage both performing and nonperforming credit exposures; these derivatives do not qualify for hedge accounting under U.S. GAAP.
So from a financial reporting perspective, all the media and trader chatter about “hedge or bet?” is moot.
The bank may now be calling the positions an “economic hedge” but, in hindsight, they look to me like a series of trades designed to generate income that spiraled out of control on incorrect or ignored risk information and lack of control over traders.
“It was there to deliver a positive result in a quite stressed environment,” Dimon said on the May 10 emergency conference call, “and we feel we can do that and make some net income.”
The rest of the American Banker column provides the details. .....



All information on this website is for educational purposes only and is not intended to provide financial advise. Any statements about profits or income, expressed or implied, does not represent a guarantee. Your actual trading may result in losses as no trading system is guaranteed. You accept full responsibilities for your actions, trades, profit or loss, and agree to hold MinKL Invest harmless in any and all ways.